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Rather than going  all or nothing on the integrity of the network with each wager - using checks and balances of voters, audits, and miners - I suggest using supply and demand. Say there is a successful attack. Say even that it's proven ahead of time that it will be successful so to avoid being penalized voters switch over, and only some tiny minority of shareholder voters stay honest - say 1%. No audit is triggered. The miners are asleep at the switch and don't veto. That decision gets made wrong, the people who should lose win, and those who should win lose. Is this the end of the PM market, or can it instead be the beginning? Say that any non-unanimous decision results in an addressable softfork. A future trader can post an opening wager that indicates it will be decided as if that past decision had gone the other way. This allows the traders to decide which subset of shareholders to trust. Thus any conflicting decisions will split the market into two markets - a liar's market and an honest market. Each market is supported only by the wage makers who use it. Both markets are mined on the same chain. Only unused markets are eventually trimmed by miners and hardforked out of existence when potential future fees from that fork don't justify its existence. Now the honest shareholders will get most of the business from anyone seeking an honest prediction market, and will address future wagers to the 1% and trade only those wagers.  People who want a corrupt market are free to use the main fork and get their money stolen. Over time the honest 1% will prevaill through supply and demand, and will regain any temporary losses from betrayal through perseverance, while the 99% only get their profits from the open wagers when their exit scam became public knowledge. Now the PM can survive a 99% attack from liars. Now that is good Byzantine fault tolerance

Why doesn't this site use https encryption?    I feel naked.  LOL.