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Futurecoin: a decentralized prediction market. Joseph Bonneau, Jeremy Clark, Edward Felten, Joshua Kroll, Andrew Miller and Arvind Narayanan. To appear, WEIS 2014. June 2014.  from Andrew Miller's page

Probably this paper: On Decentralizing Prediction Markets and Order Books. It cites TruthCoin, but says this about using a voting system for outcome judgement:

... assuming a market with a clear outcome, this system produces an iterated game of chicken between coalitions of voters holding shares in each outcome. If either coalition is able to convince the other that they are absolutely going to spend their N/2 votes on their preferred outcome, the other side is incentivized to back down and concede to prevent losing their bond. It is only be repeated play, in which participants have a reputation to maintain that will be damaged if they vote for a patently incorrect outcome, that this game can be avoided. Thus we think this approach is less desirable as it requires tracking reputations for all participants in the market and not just a small number of adjudicators.


Yes, it will almost certainly be the paper you mention. I give a brief response in my FAQ.

I'm just suddenly curious about your background, can you PM me your linkedin or something?
Nullius In Verba


Quote from: psztorc on June 17, 2014, 05:39:41 PM
Yes, it will almost certainly be the paper you mention. I give a brief response in my FAQ.

Ah, here it is.

My response is that tracking a large number voter reputations is a simple, straightforward task. Needing to trust/choose a small number of adjudicators is the less desirable option, IMO.

But it does explain why tracking voter reputation is necessary in the TruthCoin design: it prevents the "iterated game of chicken". I wasn't fully convinced of the need for voter reputation until I read that paragraph.