Recent posts
#51
Design / Incentives / Game Theory / Re: drivechain
Last post by psztorc - May 20, 2016, 03:50:14 PM> We don't need an oracle to create this type of PM.
> The blockchain doesn't have to learn any meatspace information. It knows how much money was given to the crowdfund.
Yes, you do need meatspace information, to set the Schelling Indicator. Otherwise there's no way to control who gets the money.
> I think you can already do this type of crowdfunding with bitcoin.
Yes this is the Lighthouse project / Anyone-can-spend.
> Couldn't anyone make an altcoin to commit these same attacks that you describe for sidechains?
Yes, but the altcoin would not have sufficient mining power. This is discussed in the blog post "Oracles are the Real Smart Contracts".
> The blockchain doesn't have to learn any meatspace information. It knows how much money was given to the crowdfund.
Yes, you do need meatspace information, to set the Schelling Indicator. Otherwise there's no way to control who gets the money.
> I think you can already do this type of crowdfunding with bitcoin.
Yes this is the Lighthouse project / Anyone-can-spend.
> Couldn't anyone make an altcoin to commit these same attacks that you describe for sidechains?
Yes, but the altcoin would not have sufficient mining power. This is discussed in the blog post "Oracles are the Real Smart Contracts".
#52
Design / Incentives / Game Theory / Re: Hivemind Lightning Network...
Last post by zack - May 20, 2016, 03:23:14 PMBecause altcoins exists, and because you collect trading fees, lightning network introduces a flaw.
Pairs of traders can participate in hundreds of trades, then close their channel as if they had only participated in one trade.
This way, they don't have to pay as many trading fees.
They lock coins on the ethereum side as a promise not to bring each other to trial.
If the oracles aren't over-paid, they will steal.
Pairs of traders can participate in hundreds of trades, then close their channel as if they had only participated in one trade.
This way, they don't have to pay as many trading fees.
They lock coins on the ethereum side as a promise not to bring each other to trial.
If the oracles aren't over-paid, they will steal.
#53
Design / Incentives / Game Theory / Re: Paying the oracle
Last post by zack - May 20, 2016, 03:15:54 PMEthereum already has bitcoin relay. If hivemind was very popular, they would participate without paying fees.
#55
Design / Incentives / Game Theory / Paying the oracle
Last post by zack - May 18, 2016, 02:33:22 PMThe oracle needs to be over-paid, or else they will steal.
Paying the oracle a trading fee wont work, because any altcoin can participate in gambling without paying the trading fee.
One way to solve this is to crowdfund a payment for the oracle before the oracle agrees to provide judgement over a decision.
That way oracles will only judge over things that pay a high enough fee.
Paying the oracle a trading fee wont work, because any altcoin can participate in gambling without paying the trading fee.
One way to solve this is to crowdfund a payment for the oracle before the oracle agrees to provide judgement over a decision.
That way oracles will only judge over things that pay a high enough fee.
#56
Off Topic / Re: I am selling Augur REP
Last post by zack - May 18, 2016, 02:25:53 PMCheck out reptrader on reddit. Maybe you can sell there.
#57
General / Download error
Last post by TheLastinLine - May 18, 2016, 08:19:56 AMHi,
I tried downloading hivemind-0.10.99-win64-setup.exe and got the following error:-
'Incorrect or no genesis block found. Wrong datadir for network.'
I just wanted to check out the software.
Thanks
I tried downloading hivemind-0.10.99-win64-setup.exe and got the following error:-
'Incorrect or no genesis block found. Wrong datadir for network.'
I just wanted to check out the software.
Thanks
#58
Off Topic / Re: I am selling Augur REP
Last post by sflicht - May 18, 2016, 02:38:50 AMOK, thanks. I'm not interested in selling any at 0.003 but perhaps I'll check back with you later.
#59
Design / Incentives / Game Theory / Re: drivechain
Last post by zack - May 17, 2016, 09:37:02 PMTo fund the oracle, we want a dominant assurance contract that succeeds if a certain amount of money is raised.
We don't need an oracle to create this type of PM.
The blockchain doesn't have to learn any meatspace information. It knows how much money was given to the crowdfund.
I think you can already do this type of crowdfunding with bitcoin.
If we make a PM that doesn't have an oracle, then it will be safe from FRP.
We can use this PM to bootstrap funding for oracle-powered PMs.
Couldn't anyone make an altcoin to commit these same attacks that you describe for sidechains?
We don't need an oracle to create this type of PM.
The blockchain doesn't have to learn any meatspace information. It knows how much money was given to the crowdfund.
I think you can already do this type of crowdfunding with bitcoin.
If we make a PM that doesn't have an oracle, then it will be safe from FRP.
We can use this PM to bootstrap funding for oracle-powered PMs.
Couldn't anyone make an altcoin to commit these same attacks that you describe for sidechains?
#60
Design / Incentives / Game Theory / Re: drivechain
Last post by psztorc - May 17, 2016, 08:26:40 PMA perfect likeness. : )
However, I do not see the contradiction. Conditional on prediction markets existing, one might use a type of market to address the free-rider problem.
X = Blockchain Prediction Markets Exist
Y = Use of PMs to (potentially) address FRP.
So I do argue that X --> Y.
However, in the presentation, I argue that a different free rider problem interferes with the use of blockchain oracles, which are required for blockchain prediction markets.
If we assume:
V = Permissionless Implementation
W = Blockchain Oracles are Possible
I do argue that V ---> not-W.
Since we all agree that W is necessary for X,
V --> not X
V --> not Y.
It's like saying that a sorcerer could use magic to keep himself alive forever. If he's dead now, for any reason, it doesn't matter what he *could* do if he were alive.
However, I do not see the contradiction. Conditional on prediction markets existing, one might use a type of market to address the free-rider problem.
X = Blockchain Prediction Markets Exist
Y = Use of PMs to (potentially) address FRP.
So I do argue that X --> Y.
However, in the presentation, I argue that a different free rider problem interferes with the use of blockchain oracles, which are required for blockchain prediction markets.
If we assume:
V = Permissionless Implementation
W = Blockchain Oracles are Possible
I do argue that V ---> not-W.
Since we all agree that W is necessary for X,
V --> not X
V --> not Y.
It's like saying that a sorcerer could use magic to keep himself alive forever. If he's dead now, for any reason, it doesn't matter what he *could* do if he were alive.