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Binary event LMSR is pretty easy, but continuous events are another matter. I've been trying to understand the scaled contracts spreadsheet. Just the basic scaled one for now (multi-variate scaled next time).

I annotated it with some notes and questions:



Main question is, how is the event resolved, and payouts done for a scaled contract?

[all]

I haven't read the post yet (and don't particularly look forward to it), but from what you've told me, its still true that a group of rich individuals comprising a large amount of money have an incentive to contact each other and set an alternative coordination point. It is (now) more-similar to TC in that "there is a slight incentive to trick other people into voting falsely to take their money" (double-agent idea), which is an improvement. If Buterin "made" SC more similar to TC it would improve even more, because the addition of multiple decisions would greatly increase the importance of a unique solution (as it gives fully-honest-voters much-needed extra weight), and makes it much more difficult for attackers to coordinate.

Yes, I think you are right. The new SchellingCoin post doesn't address those subtle (but important) game-theory issues/incentives. Good thing too, as you mention, it would probably be duplicated effort at approaching an imperfect copy of TruthCoin. Rather, its focused on explaining mundane implementation details, stuff like how to use the Ethereum Virtual Machine to sort arrays. Its most useful in helping deal with the kind of issues somnicule faced in how to loop over user accounts.

Well, I guess Vitalik is looking for a succinct name of the underlying principle, at risk of pedantic inaccuracy (he faced similar criticism when he distinguished the Ethereum scripting language by calling it Turing-complete).

My argument is that it is the same underlying idea behind SchellingCoin and TruthCoin, and even the bitcoin blockchain:

Thus, knowing only that the only value that other people's answers are going to be biased towards is the actual wei/UScent, the rational choice to vote for in order to maximize one's chance of being near-median is the wei/UScent itself. Hence, it's in everyone's best interests to come together and all provide their best estimate of the wei/UScent price. An interesting philosophical point is that this is also the same way that proof-of-work blockchains work, except that in that case what you are voting on is the time order of transactions instead of some particular numeric value;

Is there a better name for this than Schelling Point?

Yes, because the name is wrong. I don't know what the new name should be, "StakeCoin", "BetCoin", "PlutocracyCoin", "VitalikCoin", possibly a new word needs to be invented.

A Schelling Point has the following characteristics:
1] >1 Players are in a Game, where they must make one or more selections ("up", "left", 35, etc).
2] The players can't talk to each other at all (note that Truthcoin breaks this assumption, but attempts to contain the damage with encryption, double-agent-incentive, and careful construction of the payout function, to make communication non-credible).
3] The players would all do their personal best if all players made the same selection.
4] The selection itself is irrelevant to the players, any fully-coordinated selection would do. Payoff-wise, no one knows anything about someone's preference for a certain equilibrium.

3 and 4 are the main problems.  They're true for each Truthcoin subgame of one Voting Round, mainly because of the separation of Votecoins and money. 4 most of all is false for SchellingCoin (which is my main problem with calling it a Schelling focal point), as the players will, at any point in time, prefer very different and specific equilibria (they'd like to win on all their investments). Specifically, his first sentence is obviously false, and is practically plagiarized from BitsharesX anyway (its false for BitsharesX as well).

I agree that the choice of 'most work' would be a better candidate for Schelling Point, but the effect is ruined by having everyone purposefully download software which explicitly does this (see 4 and especially 2 above).

Thanks, this explanation helps a lot. It makes sense, where he says "the only value that other people's answers are going to be biased towards is the actual wei/UScent", that is false because if a group of rich people collude, their answer will be biased toward whatever value they use to manipulate the outcome and collect everyone else's deposits. However, it would be true under the assumption that there's no entity coordinating >51% of the stake for a collusion attack, I think.

I still need to think more about how TruthCoin resists that by the separation of Votecoins and money, that's actually what I was trying to get at when I started this thread.

I have a small problem with you referring to Truthcoin as an 'extension' of SchellingCoin. Its clear from your writing that you don't mean to imply this, but I think, taken alone, the word 'extension' implies that I saw an existing SchellingCoin and 'extended' it (as you can't extend something which doesn't exist). In reality, I wrote Truthcoin in January, after researching all existing crypto attempts at PMs (which was time-consuming), and after writing the first proof-of-concept code over the previous two months. Buterin wrote months later and (on this instance) did not do any of this scholarly work, so "SchellingCoin is a reduction of Truthcoin".

Yeah, I used the word extension to mean that the TruthCoin model "extends" the basic idea of a decentralized oracle that rewards users for consensus votes. In its most basic form, its vulnerable to all sorts of collusion attacks to manipulate the outcomes, but TruthCoin extends the basic model (adding reputation, SVD, etc) to give it resistance to attacks. (not insisting here, just using it in more context to clarify).

I was alternatively going to use "SchellingCoin as a step to TruthCoin" as the thread topic. I'm not sure what the best verbiage would be (SchellingCoin 2.0? ), just trying to get the point across that there's the basic concept of a decentralized oracle, and a well thought-out version that's a lot more resistant to attack.

The old comments at blog.ethereum.org were apparently lost when they moved to new CMS/comment software, but they were archived. For completeness, I'll quote here what vbuterin said about TruthCoin:

That’s a futarchy protocol, for predicting the future, although it does use Schelling points to determine the truth of boolean facts. It’s interesting, although tackling a somewhat different problem. Here I’m specifically focused on a small number of inexact scalar values, with the challenge of dealing with players who benefit from the value being slightly higher or lower, and environments where reputation is known to be problematic to rely upon. Different animals IMO.

As for the scheme not being as thought-out, that’s just my style; I take things from 0 to 1, and rely on others to do the 1 to n. I think it’s much more important for ideas to be simple and accessible than to be optimal right out of the box.

gwern made Buterin aware of what I published, back when he made his previous post. The fact that his reaction was NOT "Wow, this would make a great Ethereum application" and was instead "I need to try again to defend my idea / make another imperfect-copy of the idea" leads me to believe that he either has an overlarge ego (ie one that interferes with his work), or that all of this (extraordinarily harmful) cult-like following is finally done the inevitable and damaged his judgement.

A couple things. First, I don't get the impression that he's defending anything, he even admits that it isn't very "thought-out". To my mind, the SchellingCoin blog posts have two basic goals: introducing the concept of a decentralized data feed (most people aren't familiar with the idea, m-of-n oracles still dominate the discussion), and introducing Serpent (an Ethereum scripting language) as a way of writing blockchain contracts. He wrote the SchellingCoin blog posts as basic coding tutorials, not a series of whitepapers. They actually follow earlier ones he wrote on "NameCoin", where he gives 4 lines of code as an example namecoin implementation. Is he saying that his version is a complete and superior decentralized name registry? Nope, just a basic example contract for scripting tutorial purposes.

Second, if he engenders a cult-like following its probably because he's quite personable for a geek. He seems to enjoy patiently explaining (to a general audience) everything from how crypto algos and blockchain mining work, to monetization strategies for open source projects. Granted, expository writing is his primary skill (it was his job at bitcoinmagazine). But he continues to produce new tutorials, most recently the SchellingCoin blog post and a hot-off-the-press Ethereum Development Tutorial. This interaction style (personable and patient as a saint) seems to be working well at recruiting developers & followers.

Contrast that with Peter Todd, who some describe as an arrogant asshole, and was even called out publicly on the bitcoin mailing list by Mike Hearn (with nods of agreement from jgarzik, slush, and others). Peter Todd claims he's just pushing back against Satoshi idol worship, but talking down to people and yelling at them to RTFM is also harmful to collaboration. I would agree with him though, Satoshi worship is going on and it is harmful. Quite the contrary in Buterin's case, he's still humbly willing to engage any degree of criticism, major or minor (for a recent example, look how he responded to a minor criticism of the SchellingCoin vote commitment scheme).

I can appreciate Peter Todd's blunt (or rude) style, but a lot of others take criticism personally and would prefer to receive it in friendly, sugar-coated wrapping. Jgarzik notes that this is an "unsolved problem" in open-source projects. I would say its a lesson which often goes unlearned (and add the adage, "those who fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it").

Is it not clear from his blog, that he could code Truthcoin himself in as much time as he spent on those two posts?

Maybe, but then most people would neither understand the code (ethereum script) nor the design (decentralized oracle)! It would just be a hunk of obscure code sitting in some github repo. Such tutorials are invaluable IMO, users don't adopt something if they can't understand it.

My Truthcoin paper is already a win for Ethereum (just as it was for the Bitshares toolkit). (It was [the only] answer to "What would you need Ethereum for?"). The fact that it isn't playing out like that over there, except to you (martinBrown), is kind of a red flag (for me).

But the Truthcoin paper doesn't specify it as an Ethereum DApp, so I guess people (or me at least) hesitate to hijack a brand if its meant to be something else and only something else. If Vitalik titled his blog post "a TruthCoin pre-alpha version on Ethereum" instead of "SchellingCoin" (assuming he took another look at TruthCoin and understood how its different from futarchy and similar to SchellingCoin), that might appear to be a little self-serving. Also, Ethereum is a win for all kinds of DApps, not just off-chain oracles, but evangelizing that message to other communities seems to mainly generate controversy. Most entrepreneurs are already set on their service being implemented on bitcoin strictly, or on MasterCoin, or NXT, or whatever happens to be their favored platform, and so aren't receptive to the idea of their baby being born on Ethereum. On the other hand, if somebody comes to an Ethereum channel/forum proposing a DApp, pretty much anything is warmly received.

Anyway, Ethereum can't be singled out here. TruthCoin was also overlooked by Gavin Andresen, for m-of-n oracles. A fully decentralized oracle is still too novel of a concept, and its playing out in an environment of skepticism and extreme favoritism in a market which is overwhelmed with innumerable pushers peddling some pet coin which promises the sky.

The Ethereum blog has a new SchellingCoin post, its a follow-up to the first.

The core idea in the first post is this:

5. Every user who submitted a correctly submitted value between the 25th and 75th percentile gains a reward of N tokens (which we'll call "schells")

I see the core idea in TruthCoin as, basically, an extension to this. In TruthCoin, users who submitted consensus votes get a reward of N tokens ("TruthCoins" or "VoteCoins" depending on the naming scheme). With SchellingCoin, users are submitting a value (voting) of a single outcome, and the consensus is measured by taking the simple median value of all the votes. With TruthCoin, users are voting on a whole set of decisions, and the consensus is measured by taking the principal eigenvector (SVD) of the vote matrix. Taking the principal eigenvector is just a way to do dimensionality reduction on the multi-dimensional matrix of voter-decisions, the result is a multi-dimensional mean: "the first principal component corresponds to a line that passes through the multidimensional mean..."

SchellingCoin measures the consensus vote over a single decision. TruthCoin measures the consensus vote over multiple decisions. Both reward users for submitting consensus votes, and punish users for submitting outliers.


The second SchellingCoin post describes users sending a deposit along with their vote:

At the end of the epoch (or, more precisely, at the point of the first "ping" during the next epoch), everyone who submitted a value for P between the 25th and 75th percentile, weighted by deposit, gets their deposit back plus a small reward, everyone else gets their deposit minus a small penalty, and the median value is taken to be the true UScent/wei price. Everyone who failed to submit a valid value for P gets their deposit back minus a small penalty.

This deposit system introduces stake to prevent sybil attacks. TruthCoin also uses stake as a defense against sybil attacks: users have to own truthcoins in order to vote, and votes are weighted by the amount of truthcoins at stake. The difference here is that the TruthCoin "deposit" is made up-front: its just the user's purchase of some TruthCoins. In SchellingCoin, each and every vote carries its own separate deposit. TruthCoin votes are also weighted by reputation - another extension of the SchellingCoin model.

Now I'm going to repeat some things I said before:

TruthCoin is basically an extension of SchellingCoin.

"Price-pegging" by portfolio replication is totally different, would be better called price-tracking. Tokens are issued which would track the price of BTC (or USD, or any other asset) through a decentralized hedging contract, described by vbuterin in SchellingCoin.

"""Whatever helps you think about it. I think SchellingCoin makes no sense, and misuses the Schelling Point idea, which requires a completely symmetric and simultaneous game with one information set and multiple equilibria all with exactly the same payout. Nothing even close to what Vitalik wrote about."""

Well, I guess Vitalik is looking for a succinct name of the underlying principle, at risk of pedantic inaccuracy (he faced similar criticism when he distinguished the Ethereum scripting language by calling it Turing-complete).

My argument is that it is the same underlying idea behind SchellingCoin and TruthCoin, and even the bitcoin blockchain:

Thus, knowing only that the only value that other people's answers are going to be biased towards is the actual wei/UScent, the rational choice to vote for in order to maximize one's chance of being near-median is the wei/UScent itself. Hence, it's in everyone's best interests to come together and all provide their best estimate of the wei/UScent price. An interesting philosophical point is that this is also the same way that proof-of-work blockchains work, except that in that case what you are voting on is the time order of transactions instead of some particular numeric value;

Is there a better name for this than Schelling Point?

The way to get things done is to create bounties. Investors donate to whichever goal they care about most, and whoever achieves the goal gets to keep all the donations.

Again, I don't agree. Firms are just more productive then a decentralized ad hoc group, particularly with difficult-to-assess contributions on a new and unique task like this one.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_the_firm Moreover, why would an investor care about funding one part (useless without the whole). Would need to be some extremely complicated network of assurance contracts. Enforcement, even tracking, these contracts would be difficult.

Mike Hearn pointed out why bounties suck in this recent interview (at about 33:40). Basically the first-come-first-serve nature encourages corner cutting as aggressively as possible by rewarding those who finish first and release rushed low-quality work, at the expense of those work slower but produce something of much higher quality.

Side chains does not exist martinBrown.

TruthCoin doesn't exist either. It's just a white paper right now, the white paper offers many possibilities and even more have been suggested on this forum (included implementation as a BitShares chain or as an Ethereum contract).

But this is all quite irrelevant to the point of my little thought experiment.

That is not how it will work at all.

I was outlining super simplified model. Thinking through a model which is simplified as much as possible helps (IMO) to form a clear answer to the original question, stated in the topic of this thread. Variations of the question were asked several more times by kolinko, and I agree with him that it hasn't been clearly answered.

There are a max of 21 million bitcoins produced through mining.
Similarly, there will be a max of 21 million truthcoins produced through mining.

At first, each truthcoin will be worth maybe 1/100000th of a bitcoin, but after a few years a truthcoin will probably be worth more than a bitcoin.

Specifying what the total supply will be doesn't help to answer the question that I was addressing (again, its the topic of this thread). But anyway...

Whichever implementation launches first, it will be an open-source project which anyone will be able to fork to their personal liking. But your proposal sounds great to me and I very much hope the zack-bitcoin/Truthcoin-POW implementation materializes exactly as you describe. I will be sure make myself an early adopter of as many of those coins as I can

BTW I may be misunderstanding the whole concept of replicating portfolio you mentioned.
Let's say that it's very early and the market depth for TruthCoins is 5BTC (so, I can buy TruthCoins for 5BTC without significantly changing the price and losing a ton of money on spread, when I want to sell TC back for BTC after the bet finalizes). Is there a way for me to make a bet for 10BTC? I get a feeling that the replicating portfolio mechanism would break, and I'd lose too much money on various spreads, but perhaps I'm wrong?

Let's simplify things for now and forget about the replicating portfolio. Suppose that TRU is an alt-coin, traded on some exchange, and the entire market cap of TRU is 5 BTC (not just market depth, but whole market cap). We're also going on the assumption that bets can only be made with TRU. Right? Because for now we're only considering TRU is an alt-coin all to itself, not as some kind of oracle which mediates bitcoin transactions. Let's also forget about the VoteCoin/TruthCoin two-token-type issue, we're keeping things as simple as possible.

So there's a total market cap of 5 BTC, and there's an ideal exchange where you trade without spread at one flat price, 10 TRU to 1 BTC, so there's a total of 50 TRU. Now you come in and buy 50 more. Now the total supply of TRU is 100, with a market cap of 10 BTC, half owned buy you. You only have 5 BTC worth of TRU, so how can you place a bet worth 10 BTC? You can't, you have to buy another 50 TRU. So you buy another 50, now you own 100 TRU, and the total supply is 150 TRU.

You place a bet with all 100 TRU. Initially, nobody is taking the other side of your bet, so really its still just an offer for someone to accept your bet. (This is where LMSR comes in, because in order to place a bet somebody first has to create a market by providing the initial liquidity for other people to bet against. But let's ignore that for now so we can keep everything dead simple). So let's say the rest of the market (the other 50 TRU of the 150 total supply) likes the odds on your bet and takes the other side. Now you've got a bet going for 50 TRU, since only half of what you've got on offer has been matched. The other half of your offer is still there waiting to be matched. But the whole TRU supply is already allocated (100 of it is your bet, the other 50 has already been matched to half of your bet). So somebody buys 50 more TRU in order to match the rest of your bet. Now the total supply is 200 TRU, total market cap is 20 BTC, and you've got a bet going for 10 BTC worth of truthcoins.

A side-chain model would be equivalent to this. The only difference is that instead of exchanging BTC to TRU on an ideal exchange with a perfectly flat price, you'd be converting BTC to TRU through the side-chain coin-pegging mechanism.

The reason I'm asking, and really the reason I launched the whole Orisi was that I wanted to create a bitcoin wallet that guarantees that would be denominated in dollars.

So what happened to the denominating bets in dollars aspect? Is there a way for Orisi to do that?

So, your current methods of pegging to bitcoin are either replacing the whole Bitcoin with TruthCoin/VoteCoin, or sidechains?

No.

Let's distinguish two different meanings of "pegging". A sidechain is two-way "coin-pegging", where one BTC is temporarily converted to one side-coin. This is more than just price pegging, it also preserves coin scarcity. The total supply of BTC + sidechain coins would never exceed the 21 million limit.

"Price-pegging" by portfolio replication is totally different, would be better called price-tracking. Tokens are issued which would track the price of BTC (or USD, or any other asset) through a decentralized hedging contract, described by vbuterin in SchellingCoin.

I find that naming scheme even more confusing. I would prefer to keep the name Truthcoins as the tokens which do the judging/voting, RBCR, etc.

The tokens for placing bets on events could be called FutureCoins (or futures, future-shares, etc). This would align with the better with the FutureCoin paper (which outlines a decentralized prediction market, but not decentralized event juries). The token names should emphasize that the defining feature of TruthCoins is decentralized adjudication of event outcomes after-the-fact, and users act as juries who get rewarded for reporting the truth. While the betting-tokens (FutureCoins, or PredictCoins) are used to place bets that are predictions of the future.

Another concern is that using *coin in the names of both tokens would tend to cause the additional confusion that they are two separate alt-coins. Every other alt-coin has only one token. But TruthCoin has two tokens working together on the same chain. I'm not aware of anything similar.

A couple new ones.

https://betcoiner.com/

https://xbet.io/ - uses CounterParty (XCP) for decentralized order books.

Not sure if its working... What's going on here?




Then I got this when I tried the latest commit (with the consensus stuff):

His post starts by discussing an idea of "Eigenmorality".

In an attempt to measure the players' morality, Tyler uses the eigenmorality idea from before. The extent to which player A "cooperates" with player B is simply measured by the percentage of times A cooperates. ... This then gives us a "cooperation matrix," whose (i,j) entry records the total amount of niceness that player i displayed to player j.  Diagonalizing that matrix, and taking its largest eigenvector, then gives us our morality scores.

Note that the linear algebra here, diagonalizing a matrix and taking its largest eigenvector (aka principal eigenvector), is exactly what TruthCoin does, by way of Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) on the vote-matrix. The largest eigenvector of the TruthCoin vote-matrix is the voter consensus, and that "consensus vector" is then used as the input to Reputation Based Coin Redistribution (RBCR).


After outlining Eigenmorality, his train of thought leads to linear algebra for crowdsourced democracy:

At first glance, the above definitions sound ludicrously circular—even Orwellian—but we now know that all that's needed to unravel the circularity is a principal eigenvector computation on the matrix of trust.  And the computation of such an eigenvector need be no more "Orwellian" than ... well, Google.  If enough people want it, then we have the tools today to put flesh on these definitions, to give them agency: to build a crowd-sourced deliberative democracy, one that "usually just works" in much the same way Google usually just works.

But wait, how would using linear algebra work better than relying on trusted subject-matter experts? Because, linear algebra lets us objectively distinguish liars' attempts to distort the consensus:

Now, would those with axes to grind try to subvert such a system the instant it went online?  Certainly. ... So there would arise a parallel world of trust and consensus and "expertise," mutually-reinforcing yet nearly disjoint from the world of the real.  But here's the thing: anyone would be able to see, with the click of a mouse, the extent to which this parallel world had diverged from the real one. ... The deniers and their think-tanks would be exposed to the sun; they'd lose their thin cover of legitimacy.

Here he proposes using an eigenvector as a "force of law":

But the point of an eigentrust system wouldn't be to convince everyone.  As long as I'm fantasizing, the point would be that, once people's individual decisions did give rise to a giant connected trust component, the recommendations of that component could acquire the force of law.  The formation of the giant component would be the signal that there's now enough of a consensus to warrant action, despite the continuing existence of a vocal dissenting minority—that the minority has, in effect, withdrawn itself from the main conversation and retreated into a different discourse. ... This is still democracy; it's just democracy enhanced by linear algebra.

This is what TruthCoin does. Again, the principal eigenvector of the vote-matrix becomes a "force of law" (as in the Lawrence Lessig slogan, "code is law") that awards/redistributes p2p digital coins.

The obligatory citation of Robin Hanson and futarchy:

Other people will object that, while we should use the Internet to improve the democratic process, the idea we're looking for is not eigentrust or eigenmorality but rather prediction markets.  Such markets would allow us to, as my friend Robin Hanson advocates, "vote on values but bet on beliefs."  For example, a country could vote for the conditional policy that, if business-as-usual is predicted to cause sea levels to rise at least 4 meters by the year 2200, then an aggressive emissions reduction plan will be triggered, but not otherwise.  But as for the prediction itself, that would be left to a futures market: a place where, unlike with voting, there's a serious penalty for being wrong, namely losing your shirt.  If the futures market assigned the prediction at least such-and-such a probability, then the policy tied to that prediction would become law.
...
But just like Google, whatever its flaws, works well enough for you to use it dozens of times per day, so a crowd-sourced eigendemocracy might —just might— work well enough to save civilization.

An addendum in response to the comments discussion. He asks, is there a way to incentivize people and "suss out the truth"?

Moving on to eigendemocracy, here I think the biggest problem is one pointed out by commenter Rahul.  Namely, an essential aspect of how Google is able to work so well is that people have reasons for linking to webpages other than boosting those pages' Google rank.  In other words, Google takes a link structure that already exists, independently of its ranking algorithm, and that (as the economists would put it) encodes people's "revealed preferences," and exploits that structure for its own purposes.
...
By contrast, consider an eigendemocracy, with a giant network encoding who trusts whom on what subject.  If the only reason why this trust network existed was to help make political decisions, then gaming the system would probably be rampant: people could simply decide first which political outcome they wanted, then choose the "experts" such that claiming to "trust" them would do the most for their favored outcome.  It follows that this system can only improve on ordinary democracy if the trust network has some other purpose, so that the participants have an actual incentive to reveal the truth about who they trust.  So, how would an eigendemocracy suss out the truth about who trusts whom on which subject?  I don't have a very good answer to this, and am open to suggestions.

A couple of comments already hint at the similarities to bitcoin:

That "trust" network discussion reminds me of the bitcoin network somehow...
...
(1) This seems very similar to the block chain innovation used in bitcoin.

See also: HN discussion

Purchasing reputation is a type of sybil attack (similar to ballot stuffing). This is often one of the first issues brought up as a weakness in TruthCoin's use of voters, especially when considering the possible scenario where TruthCoin might be used to adjudicate the outcomes of bets denominated in bitcoin. I'm not sure that the current docs are clear enough on how TruthCoin prevents such sybil attacks.

In particular, here is an ongoing reddit thread exemplifying the confusion:

Another problem that I have with TruthCoin though... Doesn't it assume that someone could "buy truth"? Let's say that TC's market cap is 1M ether. I could then create a contract for 2M ether, and buy enough TC to swing the vote in my favour? I'd lose my all TC because of that, and probably kill te whole TC currency, but i'd be awarded for 2M for the contract fulfillment. In oher words - Isn't TC feasible to protect a contract only up to an amount of TC's market cap?

And further down...

> TruthCoin voter decisions are not used to adjudicate the outcomes of prediction markets in other coins.

Well, this is a direct quote from the TruthCoin whitepaper. Article IV, Page 19, section (b).(i.):
"Most critically of all, this system will have to sign Withdrawal Transactions so that users can bring Bitcoin out of this system and back into their personal wallets."

Also, straight from the Abstract on Page 1:
"Bitcoin users can create PMs on any subject, or trade anonymously within any PM, and all PMs enjoy low fees and permanent market liquidity through a LMSR market maker."

So it seems that you missed something about TruthCoin

Maybe a paragraph or two can be written to address this argument in particular, and clear up the confusion? Its not the first time I've heard someone raise the same objection.

Not an art critic, but I found this to be a fascinating read: The ABC of Accelerationist Blockchain Critique

From r/ethereum

Maybe ConspiracyCoin should be a separate chain? Or will it work better as a branch on TruthCoin?